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I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T 
O F T H E S T A T E O F U T A H 
DON WILLIAMSON and JODIE K. ] 
WILLIAMSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
GEORGE R. WANLASS and LORNA L. 
WANLASS, 
Defendants and Appellants 
) Case No. 14076 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for the acceleration of a note 
secured by a mortgage which was given in partial payment for 
the purchase of a farm* 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before the Court sitting without 
a jury. Judgment was granted for Plaintiffs in the amount of 
$18,023.50 plus interest at the rate of 5-1/2% per annum from 
July 1, 1973, to date of Judgment plus attorneys fees in the 
amount "of $2,000.00. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment and the 
reinstatement of the note, providing for installment payments 
with costs and attorney fees awarded to Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early part of 1971, the Wanlasses, who are the 
Defendants in this action, began looking for a farm to buy. 
The Williamsons, who are the Plaintiffs in this action, heard 
that Wanlasses were looking and approached them with an offer 
to sell their farm. At that point, the Wanlasses went to 
Attorney Charles P. Olson and discussed the negotiations. 
Mr. Olson prepared an Offer to Purchase for the Wanlasses. 
(Tr. 9-11) This offer was changed several times, but after 
more negotiations the offer was finally accepted by the Williamsons. 
(Ex. 1) 
It turned out that Mr. Olson had represented the 
Williamsons in the past and Mr. Olson prepared the papers for 
both parties. As a matter of course, the Wanlasses went to 
Mr. Olson's office and signed the documents which had been 
prepared. Both parties relied on Mr. Olson for legal advice 
in this matter and each paid for his services. (Tr. 19-2 0) 
Sometime later a dispute arose over some hay which 
had been involved in the original deal and Attorney Olson acted 
as arbitrator. He negotiated a settlement between the parties 
which was satisfactory to both. (Tr. 21-22) 
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The original deal which was negotiated called for 
a down payment of $1975.00, $89,000.00 to be paid at the time 
of closing of a loan, and $20,000.00 to be paid in installments. 
The Offer to Purchase stated that this $20,000.00 was to be 
represented by a promissory note secured by machinery and farm 
equipment. The note which was executed on May 1, 1971, states 
that it was secured by a second mortgage on real estate and was 
to be paid in equal monthly installments of $163.42 until paid 
off. (Ex. 2) (A financing statement on the machinery was filed 
and a mortgage on real estate was recorded in connection with 
this note.) (Ex. 9, 10) 
The note payments commenced on June 1, 1971, and were 
current in June, 1973. (Tr. 31) All of the payments were mailed 
to the Williamsons1 address in Hyrum, Utah, and were made by 
check. No objection was ever made to payment by check through 
the mails. (Tr. 49-50) Approximately 15 of the 25 payments 
made to that time were not paid on exactly the first day of each 
month. In a couple of instances the payments were made more 
than a month late. However, the payments were made up in the 
succeeding months so that as of June 30, 1973, all payments 
were up to date. (Ex. 5) 
Mrs. Williamson called when the payments got behind 
in May or June of 1972 and the Wanlasses brought the payments 
current. In February of 1973, the payments got behind again 
and the Williamsons called Attorney Olson and asked him to 
write a letter to the Wanlasses and ask them to bring the 
payments current. After that letter the payments were made 
on time through June, 1973, 
Mr. Wanlass prepared a check on or about the 9th 
day of July, which he deposited in the mail in an envelope 
addressed to the Williamsons in Hyrum. Apparently that 
payment was never received by them. (Tr. 90-92) Then on 
the 1st of August, Mr. Wanlass made out a check to the 
Williamsons which was apparently not mailed until the evening 
of the 6th of August or sometime on the morning of the 7th, 
since the letter was postmarked August 7, A.M., (Ex. 8) 
On August 3, the Williamsons went to Attorney Olson 
who prepared a note of acceleration which was received by 
the Wanlasses on August 7, after the August payment had been 
mailed. (Tr. 105? Ex. 4) As soon as the notice was received 
Mr. Wanlass unsuccessfully tried to call Mr. Williamson. 
(Tr. 101) He then stopped payment on the July check since 
the notice indicated it had not been received. (Ex. 27)-
He immediately wrote a letter and a new check for the July 
payment and mailed them to the Williamsons. (Tr. 38; Ex. 6,7) 
Every payment, up to and including the date of the 
trial, was tendered to the Williamsons or their attorney. 
None of the checks after the June 1973 check have been 
cashed. After the notice of acceleration, the Williamsons 
proceeded to file a law suit for collection of the note. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ACCELERATION 
CLAUSES IS GOVERNED BY GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
AND EQUITY, UTAH CASE LAWf AND NOT JUST THE 
COMMERCIAL CODE, 
One of the issues which arose in District Court 
was which law was to apply to the construction and enforcement 
of acceleration clauses in a promissory note executed as part 
of a real estate transaction. Plaintiffs contended that 
Article 3 of the Commercial Code was the only law which was 
to apply to the promissory note since it was a negotiable 
instrument. A corollary to this argument was that Utah law 
dealing with acceleration clauses in mortgages and real estate 
contracts had no application to this case. The Defendants 
have taken the position that the construction and enforcement 
of a promissory note executed as part of a real estate trans-
action and secured by a mortgage is governed by Utah case law 
and the general principles of law and equity as well as the 
UCC. 
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code deals 
with the negotiability of instruments. The only provision 
which mentions acceleration is UCA 70A-3-109 dealing with 
payment at definite time. That provision merely states that 
negotiability is not affected by an acceleration provision. 
There is no provision in Article 3 dealing with the construction 
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or enforceability of acceleration clauses. In fact, the 
only provision which deals with those questions is UCA 
70A-1-2G8 which says essentially, "A term providing that 
one party or his successor in interest may accelerate payment... 
fat will1 or fwhen he deems himself insecure1 or words of 
similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall have 
power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the 
prospect of payment...is impaired.11 
Outside of these references, there is nothing in 
the Commercial Code which deals with acceleration clauses. 
Furthermore, the Code itself states that all of the documents 
executed in relation to a particular transaction are merely 
parts of the whole. A particular part cannot be isolated 
without reference to the whole transaction. UCA 70A-3-119(1) 
states in parts 
"As between the obligor and his immediate obligee 
or any transferee, the terms of an instrument may 
be modified or affected by any other written agreement 
executed as a part of the same transaction..." 
A recent North Dakota decision referred to that 
statefs counterpart of the above section in stating: 
"(this section) applies to negotiable instruments 
the general rule that writings executed as part 
of the same transaction are to be read together as 
a single agreement because, as between the immediate 
parties, a negotiable instrument is merely a 
contract and is no exception to the rule that 
the courts will look to the entire contract in 
writing." Sanden v. Hansen 201 WW2d 404 (N.D. 1972). 
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The implication of this rule is that all of the documents 
executed in this transaction can be looked to for relevant 
provisions to show the nature of the entire transaction* 
Further, the transaction was in real estate and the 
installment note was secured by a mortgage. As this court 
stated in American Savings v. Blomquist 21 Utah 2d 2892, 
445 Pld 1 (1968) at 4: 
"The Courts proceed on the theory that the note 
and mortgage, though separate instruments, are 
not separate contracts, but, being executed at the 
same time and in the course of the same transaction, 
constitute a single contract." 
In light of this rule, it is difficult to see how it could 
be argued that the promissory note is to be enforced solely 
under the provisions of Article 3. 
As pointed out by UCA 70A*~1«~103, unless displaced 
by a particular provision of the UCC, the general principles 
of law and equity supplement its provisions. Although it 
is clear that acceleration clauses are allowed to be included 
in instruments without affecting their negotiability, Article 
3 says nothing about the interpretation or enforceability of 
such clauses. In fact, we must go to UCA 7QA~i~208 to get 
what information there is in the Commercial Code on the law 
of enforcing such clauses. 
The "other written agreements executed as part 
of the same transaction" in this case include an offer to 
purchase, a trust deed, a mortgage, and a financing statement 
on equipment. All of these together show the existence of 
a real estate transaction accompanied by the sale of personal 
property. Further, the note in question was secured by equip-
ment (as evidenced by the offer to purchase and the financing 
statement) as well as a mortgage on real property (as stated 
on the note). In this particular case, attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Defendant agreed that the plaintiff would not tie up 
the collateral and interfere with the operation of the farm 
while the note was being litigated. 
The Commercial Code does not attempt to cover every 
possible issue that can arise in connection with commercial 
transactions. In fact, 70A-1-103 states: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions 
of this act, the principles of law and equity... 
shall supplement its provisions." 
It should be apparent from this discussion that 
all of the writings in this transaction should be looked 
at by the Court. Unless displaced by particular provisions 
of the Code, the general principles of lav; and equity apply, 
and the application of these principles should be determined 
by an examination of Utah case law in similar fact situations. 
II. COURSE OF DEALING AND PERFORMANCE ESTABLISHED 
THE TIME AND MODE OF PAYMENT 
The time and mode of payment under this note were 
established over a period of two years between the parties. 
The evidence was conclusive that the Plaintiffs had accepted 
check payments mailed to their Hyrum address from the beginning 
of the agreement. The rule appears to be that if the creditor 
has authorized use of the mails for payment, payment is made 
when the letter containing the payment is deposited in the 
mail with postage prepaid. This applies to payments by check 
even though the check may not clear the bank for several 
days after deposit. United Security Corp. v. Franklin 180 
A2d 505, See, 60 Am. Jur. 2d "Payment"§11. The mode of payment 
can be established by course of dealing and if the obligee 
has agreed to receive payment by mail the risk of loss in 
the event of non-delivery falls on the creditor. The deposit 
of a letter in the mail containing a check constitutes payment 
and a delay in delivery cannot be the basis for working a 
forfeiture and does not constitute a default. See, Mutual 
Reserve v. Tuchfeld, 159 F 833 and 6C Am. Jur. 2d , "Payment" 
§17. 
III. TENDER OF OVERDUE PAYMENTS WAS MADE BEFORE 
OPTION TO ACCELERATE WAS EXERCISED AND CUT 
OFF RIGHT TO EXERCISE THE OPTION. 
In this case, the acceleration clause of the promissory 
note stated, "If any installment is not paid at the time 
it becomes due, the holders of this note, at their option, 
may declare the whole due and payable, in which event interest 
shall commence to run at the rate of eight (8%) percent per 
annum on the entire amount due, from date of notice until 
paid." (emphasis added) 
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As can be seen, this particular provision gives 
the holders of this note an option to acclerate. This Court 
has adopted the general rule as to clauses of this type. 
Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Washington, 108 Utah 469, 161 P2d 
355 at 358. 
"Under a contract which provides that any 
default in the payment of the interest of 
an installment of the principal when due shall 
give the obligee an option to declare the 
whole amount due, the general rule is that a 
tender of payment of the overdue principal or 
interest before the option to declare the whole 
debt due has been exercised cuts off the right 
to exercise the option." 
The facts in this case, along with the rules on mode and 
time of payment, establish that a tender of the overdue principal 
was made before the option was exercised. It is undisputed 
that the July payment was placed in the mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to Plaintiffs on or about the 9th of July. It 
is also undisputed that the payment for August was mailed 
prior to the receipt of Plaintiff's notice of acceleration, 
on either the 6th or 7th of August* Since the risk of loss 
is on Plaintiff when the accepted mode of payment is by mail 
and no forfeiture can be worked against Defendants on that 
basis, the July payment cannot be used to show default. 
Then, prior to the receipt of the notice of acceleration 
in which Plaintiffs supposedly exercised their option, tender 
of the August payment had already been made by mail under 
the rules concerning the time of payment when made by mail. 
Application of the Home Owner's case to these facts 
shows that the right to exercise the option had been cut 
off* The notice of acceleration itself relied on the non-
receipt of the July payment as well as the August payment 
as the basis for acceleration: 
"You are notified that you are delinquent for 
the month of July, and that the August 1st payment, 
has not been paid, and the undersigned hereby elect 
to declare the entire amount due and payable. 
DATED this 3rd day of August, 1973." 
Not only can the Plaintiffs not rely on the non-
receipt of the July payment, but since the payments were 
made by mail, the 3rd day of August is not allowing sufficient 
time for the receipt of a payment even if made on the 1st. 
All of these facts and circumstances should be 
viewed in light of this comment by the New Mexico Supreme 
Court. 
"A court of equity will scan very closely the 
enforcement of an acceleration clause which will 
work great hardship on the debtor." Carmichael 
V. Rice, 158 P2d 290 (NM, 1945) at 29TI — 
The actions of the creditor in this case simply do 
not conform to the standards set forth by this Court and others 
to govern the construction and exercise of acceleration clauses. 
IV. UTAH LAW REQUIRING NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND 
REASONABLE TIME TO BRING CONTRACT CURRENT 
SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE 
A fairly recent Utah case not only required the Seller 
to give notice of default before exercising his options because 
of a failure on the part of the purchaser to pay an installment 
as promised, but it required a reasonable time allowance for 
the purchaser to bring the contract current. This case is 
Lamont v. Evjen 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P2d 532 (1973). While 
the particular facts deal with a uniform real estate contract, 
the same protections for the buyer which are stated there 
should apply to this case. In fact, Lamont dealt with the 
right to accelerate the amount prior to mortgage foreclosure 
so technically it is not a foreclosure action. Had the buyer 
in this case opted to invoke the one action rule set forth 
in UCA 78-37-1 (Supp)., the procedures that would have been 
followed would have been identical to those in Lamont. 
When the Lamont case is considered in light of 
the rule that the general rules of law and equity are to 
supplement Commercial Code provisions, the importance of 
this case becomes apparent. In that case, this Court upheld 
the lower court which granted a dismissal on the following 
grounds: 
"It appears that the plaintiffs failed to 
establish that they gave notice to the Defendants 
of their election to treat the contract as a note 
and mortgage prior to a full tender of the amount 
due. Besides, the defendants were not given a 
reasonable time in which to make good the delinquent 
installment.,f 
Obviously, these terms were not complied with in 
the instant case. 
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There was a provision in the note which allegedly 
waived notice of non-payments 
"The makers, sureties, guarantors, and 
endorsers hereof severally waive presentment 
for payment and notice of non-payment of 
this note." 
This provision may not appear to be too onerous as far as 
commercial practice is concerned until it is remembered that 
both parties were represented by the same counsel (which 
point will be discussed later) and particularly in light 
of the fact that payments were made by mail. If payments 
were to be made in person, then this provision may have been 
acceptable, but when the risk of loss is on the creditor 
as in this case, it is unconscionable for the creditor to 
be able to exercise default options without giving notice 
of non-payment and an opportunity to made good any lost payments. 
Even if the Lamont case could be distinguished 
because of its facts, the general attitude of the Courts 
in respect to acceleration clauses has been expressed in 
10 CJS 748 Bills & Notes §251. 
"An acceleration clause is to be construed as 
any other provision in a contract, and is to 
be governed by the usual rules applicable to 
the construction of contracts. It has been held, 
however, that a contract to accelerate the 
maturity of a debt gives a remedy that is harsh 
in its nature, and the provision therefor, in order 
to be effective, should be clear and unequivocal; 
and, if there is reasonable doubt as to the meaning 
of the terms employed, preference should be given 
to that construction which will avoid the forfeiture 
and prevent acceleration of maturity." 
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All of the above indicates that this Court should 
look very closely at the acceleration clause and also apply 
the Lamont case in requiring notice of default and a reasonable 
time to correct any default. 
V. THE COMMERCIAL CODE REQUIRES THAT ACCELERATION 
CLAUSES BE EXERCISED ONLY IN GOOD FAITH BELIEF 
THAT PROSPECT OF PAYMENT IS IMPAIRED 
The main concern of Article 3 of the UCC on Commercial 
Paper is negotiability. This fact can be gleaned from a 
quick perusal of the section headings, but is also explicit 
in the comments to UCA 7QA-3-1Q9. The section makes it clear 
that the addition of an acceleration clause does not affect 
negotiability, but it refers us to other law for the resolution 
of construction and enforceability problems. Comment 4 
to §3-109 states that potential abuse of acceleration clauses 
is governed by §1-208. 
"So far as certainty of time of payment is 
concerned a note payable at a definite time 
but subject to acceleration is no less certain 
than a note payable on demand, whose negotiability 
never has been questioned. It is in fact more 
certain, since it at least states a definite time 
beyond which the instrument cannot run. Objection 
to the acceleration clause must be based on tKe 
possibility of abuse by the" holder, which has" 
nothing to do with negotiability and is not limited 
to negotiable instruments. That problem is now 
covered by Section 1-&Q8." (emphasis added) 
Section 1-208 will be discussed below, but the 
comment goes on to state that the Commercial Code does not 
take a position on certain construction problems since the 
abuse has no effect on negotiability: 
"Subsection (1) (c) is intended to mean that the 
certainty of time of payment or the negotiability 
of the instrument is not affected by any acceleration 
clause-, whether acceleration be at the option of the 
maker or the holder, or automatic upon the occurrence 
of some event, and whether it be conditional or 
unrestricted* If the acceleration term itself is 
uncertain it may fail on ordinary contract principles; 
but the instrument then remains negotiable and is 
payable' at the definite time," (emphasis added) 
The Code position on acceleration clauses, at least 
in Article 3, is that the absence or presence of such clauses 
does not affect negotiability* Article 3 takes no position 
on thie construction or effect of such clauses but refers 
us to Section 1-208 for solution of one particular problem 
and for the solution of others refers us to "ordinary contract 
principles," 
Section 1-208 (which of course is not part of Article 
3 but is in the "General Provision" Article of the Code) 
states: 
"Section 1-208. Option to Accelerate at Will: 
A term providing that one party or his successor 
in interest may accelerate payment or performance 
or require collateral or additional collateral 
"at will" or "when he deems himself insecure" or 
in words of similar import shall be construed to 
mean that he shall have power to do so only if 
he in good faith believes that the prospect of 
payment or performance is impaired* The burden 
of establishing lack of good faith is on the party 
against whom the power has been exercised*" 
A careful reading of the language in the note in 
this case shows that it is not exactly the type of clause 
referred to in the above section, but the assumption can 
— 1 ~ > — 
probably be drawn that there is "good faith" belief requirement 
that the prospect of payment is impaired or the option to 
accelerate cannot be exercised. The note states: 
"If any installment is not paid at the time it 
becomes due, the holders of this note, at their 
option, may declare the whole due and payable, 
in which event interest shall commence to run at 
the rate of eight (8%) percent per annum on the 
entire amount due, from date of notice until paid." 
The philosophy of Section 1-208 seems to go along 
with the ideas expressed in 11 Am. Jur. 2d "Bills and Notes," 
§174: 
"One who advances money to another for a 
specified time on the strength of commercial 
paper usually wishes to protect himself if 
the credit risk changes prior to maturity. Such 
protection is afforded by acceleration clauses..." 
In other words, the purpose of an acceleration 
clause is to protect the creditor in case the debtor appears 
to be defaulting completely on his debt and to save the creditor 
the trouble of having to sue separately on each payment as 
it becomes due. The Commercial Code requires that the creditor 
have a good faith belief that the prospect of payment is 
impaired. See, §1-203. The whims of the creditor is not 
a sufficient basis for acceleration. In fact, if the prospect 
of payment was impaired why was Plaintiff willing to sue 
on the note and leave the security alone? In the instant 
case, a better remedy than acceleration would appear to be 
the addition of additional interest as provided for in the 
note: 
— 1 C-
"Any delinquent installment shall bear interest 
at the rate of eight (8%) percent from the date 
therefore until paid." 
This remedy was not even threatened despite continued late 
payments. 
It is clear from the evidence that while the Wanlasses 
were often late in their payments, they always made up any 
late payments and, in fact, have continued to tender the 
regular installments to the present time. If the Williamsons 
were concerned about late payments, they had the right to 
assess interest in an effort to make the Wanlasses pay on 
time, which remedy would have been much more equitable. 
As pointed out above, Section 1-208 covers only 
a particular type of acceleration clause. For interpretation 
and enforcement of clauses of other types we must rely on 
the "good faith" requirement and ordinary contract principles 
and general rules of law and equity. 
VI. A COURT OF EQUITY SHOULD NOT ALLOW 
ACCELERATION IN THIS CASE 
As discussed above, since an acceleration clause 
is a harsh remedy, in making the full amount due and increasing 
the interest rate, this Court should look very closely, both 
at the clause itself and its exercise to determine whether 
it can equitably be enforced. Looking at the facts in this 
case, this Court should refuse to enforce it. 
A look at the facts in this case does not even support 
the contention that a default existed. The payments were 
made a few days late, but that leeway was certainly established 
by course of performance (between the parties) both as to 
mode and time of payment. Even though the express terms of 
the agreement may waive such notice, the Utah Supreme Court 
has recognized situations in which notice may nevertheless 
be required. Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P2d 401 
(1942) at 403. Quoting a California Court: 
"The requirement of notice after the receipt of 
overdue payments without objection is based on the 
equitable consideration that by his conduct the 
vendor has led the vendee into the belief that the 
former will continue to waive the strict performance 
of the contract. The principle of equitable estoppel 
is involved." 
A Court of equity, looking at the enforcement of an acceleration 
clause very closely, should consider the fact that the notice 
dated August 3 cited the delinquent payment of July as well 
as a late payment for August as the reason for acceleration. 
Since it is undisputed that the mode of payment had always 
been by mail and that Plaintiffs had never objected to that 
mode and the risk of loss was therefore, on Plaintiffs, it 
would appear to be grossly inequitable as well as showing 
lack of good faith for Plaintiffs to accelerate without giving 
notice and allowing Defendants to correct the default. Essenti-
ally, the loss of the July payment is no basis at all for 
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acceleration under the above law, and August 3rd is not allowing 
much time for a timely August payment, with the mails as they 
are now. 
Even if the August payment had been mailed on August 
1, it is very possible that it may not have arrived until 
a day or two after August 3. This is especially true since 
August 3, was on a Friday. As pointed out earlier, there 
is a requirement under the UCC that acceleration clauses can 
only be exercised in "good faith." This transaction on the 
part of Plaintiffs certainly does not appear to meet that 
test. After not receiving a mail payment, it would at least 
be better to check and see if that payment was sent before 
accelerating. Certainly the prospect of payment was not impaired. 
In fact, the August 3rd notice was not notice at all, 
since at the time notice was received, Wanlass tendered payment 
and that tender was refused. Of what good is a notice that 
tells of a fait accompli? This is particularly critical where 
the evidence is that the Wanlasses, at this time, did not know 
what the due dates were for sure, since they did not have a 
copy of the contract in their possession. (Tr. pp. 87-88) 
Plaintiffs' claim that they were damaged because 
the payments were late is placed in doubt when it can be seen 
from looking at the checks which are in evidence that many 
of them were not cashed until some time after their receipt. 
If they wanted payment on the first day of each month, they 
should have inserted a note that time is of the essence or 
required tender of the money personally, rather than by mail. 
Yet never was a protest made as to the mode of payment. 
Although it was established that Mrs. Williamson 
had called Mrs. Wanlass a couple of times and asked for the 
payments to be on time, this was when the payments were a 
month or more overdue. There was a letter sent by Attorney 
Olson, but even though it asked for payments to be made on 
time, it did not change the mode of payment. 
Even if the Court should hold that the Wanlasses 
have defaulted under the contract, the alleged defaults have 
been so inconsequential that the defense of substantial performance 
should preclude the Plaintiffs from declaring a default. 
Substantial performance is defined as follows: 
"Exists where there has been no willful departure 
from the terms of the contract, and no omission 
in essential points, and the contract has been 
honestly and faithfully performed in its material 
and substantial particulars, and the only variance 
from the strict and literal performance consists 
of technical or unimportant omissions or defects." 
Black's Law Dictionary. 
The facts show that the payments have been made within 
a reasonable time following the due date and that any damage to 
the Seller would be very nominal especially in light of the fact 
that some of the Defendants1 checks have not been negotiated 
by the Plaintiffs for some 30 days after their issuance. 
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In the final analysis, not only do Plaintiffs' 
actions fail to meet the standards imposed under Utah case 
law but also fail to meet basic equity standards. 
VII. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN THIS CASE WAS 
LIMITED BY FACT THAT BOTH PARTIES RELIED 
ON SAME ATTORNEY 
The evidence shows that Defendant first approached 
Attorney Olson to draft the offer to purchase. Later Plaintiffs 
were included in the discussion. Attorney Olson completed 
all of the agreements and they were signed in his office. 
The evidence is that he did not even discuss the general "boiler 
plate" terms of the note. He later acted as arbitrator between 
the two parties in a dispute over hay. It was not until the 
Complaint was filed that Wanlasses realized that Mr. Olson was 
acting as the Williamsons1 attorney. 
In light of these circumstances, it is difficult 
to conceive how the various provisions of the note can be 
strictly construed against the Wanlasses. They were relying 
on Attorney Olson not only in drafting the instruments to 
protect both parties with fair provisions but also in arbitration. 
The notice which was sent in February. certainly does not 
read as a warning that acceleration is imminent if payments 
are a day or two late. The letter begins "Dear Folks/1 and 
refers to payments as much as two or three months late. It 
continues, "In a spirit of harmony, it would be nice if the 
payments could be made on time so there would not be any further 
friction arise. With kind regards, we are..." 
This could be construed as a reminder that payments 
two or three months late were not acceptable, but certainly 
does not put Wanlasses on notice that payment a few days late 
would be unacceptable, or which of the several remedies would 
be imposed and how. In fact, he alludes to "certain remedies" 
which, if aggravated, they will pursue* As pointed out above, 
the most logical remedy to pursue would not be acceleration 
but the interest penalty. The fact that the Wanlasses considered 
they were represented by Attorney Olson not only has impact 
on the acceleration clause, but also on the "waiver" of presentment 
for payment and notice of non-payments. 
At some point in time, the attorney could not be 
representing both parties because of the differences involved. 
At that point the Wanlasses were entitled to receive the infor-
mation necessary to protect themselves. Olson's position 
was not clear until the August 3rd letter. They should have 
been made aware exactly what would be required of them to 
avoid acceleration. This standard is stated in a recent 
California case: 
Lysick v. Walcom 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 28 ALR 3d 363 
Ca1. (1968) at 379. "Where an attorney represents 
two clients with divergent or conflicting interests 
in the same subject matter, the Lucas rule demands 
that the attorney must disclose all facts and cir-
cumstances which, in the judgment of a lawyer of 
ordinary skill and capacity, are necessary to 
enable his client to make free and intelligent 
decisions regarding the subject matter of the 
representation." 
After all, Defendants1 intent was not to default 
on the note. In fact, if Attorney Olson had continued in 
capacity as an arbitrator this dispute could probably have 
been resolved to the satisfaction of both parties as had been 
the case previously. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of acceleration clauses is to protect 
persons who advance money to another if the credit risk 
changes prior to maturity. In that way it serves a valid 
commercial purpose. This is not one of those cases. As bet-
ween two farmers, and because of the custom which was estab-
lished in the course of these payments, it would seem to be 
patently inequitable to enforce this acceleration clause 
strictly according to the language of the note. Not only 
were the Wanlasses relying on an attorney to protect their 
interests, but the practice between the parties over the two 
years established a different custom in the payment procedure. 
It is to be noted that the month prior to the loss of the 
July payment, everything was current and there is no indication 
that the credit risk had changed in the least after that time. 
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Here, the Plaintiffs are relying on a lost payment 
and a payment a few days late to accelerate• Even though all 
the past due money was tendered immediately, the Plaintiffs 
moved to file a law suit and enforce the acceleration clause• 
Considering the circumstances, a Court of equity should allow 
the contract to be paid out in installments as it most certainly 
would have been, had not the law suit been filed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
'QptfJL. 
Gary^N •/ Anderson 
Attorptey for Defendants-Appellants 
